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In this paper, I argue that once Kant has established his argument about the a priori 
transcendental ideality of Time, the objectivity of the Categories and their 
schematization can be established. If we remember that the Categories are not only 
concepts, but transcendental concepts, we will see that their objective nature is not as 
difficult to establish as if we were to consider them only as concepts as such. Further, 
once we understand the function of the Schematism and how Kant conceives of the 
Schemata, this will shed light as to the nature of the Categories themselves. Finally, I 
will propose an understanding of the relationship between the Categories and Schemata 
that will make a transcendental solution to the problem of the objectivity of the 
Categories and Schemata possible. 
 
We begin with a description of the Categories in general, and what role they plan in 
Kant’s system. With regards to the objectivity of the Categories, we must understand 
that Kant wishes to show their objective validity, and not their objective reality. But 
what would it mean for the Categories to be objectively valid instead of real? Kant 
provides us with an answer: “…[A] difficulty is revealed here that we did not encounter 
in the field of sensibility, namely how the subjective conditions of thinking should have 
objective validity i.e., yield conditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects” (A 
89-90/B 122).1 This means that we must somehow prove that the Categories constitute 
the conditions of the possibility of knowledge of objects in general. So for the 
Categories to be objectively valid is to say that there is some feature of the Categories 
that objectively grounds our judgments about experience.  
 
This characterization as objectively valid as opposed to real should give us an 
indication as to how we should further consider the Categories; it seems that we are 
dealing with logic and not ontology when it comes to the Categories. I mean “logic” 
here in a broad sense, but to characterize the categories as valid hints at the logical role 
they will play in cognition. We will see that this role is closely related to the Kant’s  
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notion of judgments and how judgments contribute to the process of cognition. In 
general, there is an important connection between the table of Judgments and the table 
of Categories. Kant says: 
 
The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a 
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations 
in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of the 
understanding. The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of 
the very same actions through which it brings the logical form of a judgment 
into concepts by means of the analytic unity, also brings a transcendental 
content into its representation by means of the synthetic unity of the 
manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure 
concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects a priori… (A 79/B 104-
5) 
 
This passage articulates the complex and important relationship between judgments and 
Categories, and we will examine this relationship in detail. 
 
When Kant says that “[t]he same function that gives unity to the different 
representations in a judgment also give unity to the mere synthesis of different 
representations in an intuition,” he is referring to the functions of judgment. Each 
function of judgment characterizes judgments in a certain way, and, analogously, there 
are functions of intuitions that characterize intuitions in a certain way. These functions 
of intuitions Kant calls Categories, or pure concepts of the understanding. Kant asserts 
that the Categories have the same functions that their corresponding functions of 
judgment have, and in this way he derives the Table of Categories. It is arguable how 
exactly each Category corresponds to each judgment, but that debate can be set aside. 
What is important is that Kant argues that there is a functional similarity between how 
we make judgments and how we organize intuitions. 
 
But now we must understand what the functions of the Categories are. If not 
specifically each Category, in general how are we to understand concepts that 
functionally unify the manifold of intuitions? This question can only be answered once 
we know what Kant thinks functions are. He says, “By a function…I understand the 
unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one” (A 68/B 
93). So with regards to intuitions, the representations that the understanding is ordering 
are simply the representations found in intuitions. Now are these representations 
ordered before they come under the function of the Categories? It seems that they 
would have to be ordered by Space and Time as forms of intuitions precisely because 
all of our intuited representations must be formally ordered by Space and Time as 
transcendental conditions for intuitions. 
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But what is the relationship between the Categories and concepts as such? Indeed, Kant 
entitles the Categories the “Pure Concepts of the Understanding,” but how are we to 
understand the Categories as concepts? The difference between the Categories and 
concepts that I would like to highlight (there are many differences) is how the 
Categories relate to objects. Let us go back to what Kant needs the Categories for in the 
first place. Kant needs the Categories to ground our cognitions objectively so that they 
relate to our thoughts and to our experiences a priori. If he can show the relationship 
between thoughts and experiences to be a priori Kant will have found the grounds of 
metaphysics as a science. So Kant must argue that the Categories relate to experience in 
an a priori fashion. We can immediately see how this relationship is different than the 
relationship between certain concepts and their objects; concepts do not relate to 
objects a priori. 
 
But there is another, and in my view more important difference between the Categories 
and concepts as such. This difference concerns what each actually relate to. Concepts as 
such are related to objects as such. My concept of “dog” is related to several dogs that 
are possible objects of my intuition. But what are the Categories related to? What they 
are related to could also be called objects, but these objects are quite different than the 
objects that concepts are related to. The Categories are related to objects of our 
intuitions that are almost wholly undetermined. They are determined insofar as they are 
subject to the pure forms of intuition i.e. Space and Time, but other than that they are 
wholly undetermined by our understanding.  
 
What exactly does it mean, then, for the Categories to be related to objects a priori, and 
how does Kant know that they are? The only way Kant can show such a conclusion is 
through a transcendental argument, and that is what he attempts. He first assumes that 
the manifold of intuition is originally wholly undetermined (let us take this assumption 
as a given, despite its problems). But Kant noticed that our intuitions are determined, 
and not only by Space and Time, but by concepts. I see that tree, and how that tree is 
different from this tree, and how this tree is five feet tall, and how that wall is ten feet 
tall. Obviously our intuitions as we experience them are determined, so we must have 
determined them. This is basically what Kant’s transcendental argument is, but there 
are, of course, details that I have left out. In general, though, we can see Kant’s 
motivation and understand his move to consider certain things about experience to be a 
priori related to the understanding. Not only are objects of my intuition determined, but 
they are also persisting in the sense that objects do not spontaneously shape-shift and 
change forms; in short, our experience is rather regular and constant. From this 
observation Kant determined that the only way this could occur out of a completely 
undetermined manifold is not only if we organized our experiences, but if these 
experiences are also organized in an a priori constant fashion.2
 
 
So the representations of the manifold (organized by Space and Time) must then be 
determined in an a priori fashion by certain functions of the understanding in order for 
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us to have the experiences that we do in fact have. How these functions each 
specifically order our intuitions and how these functions relate to each moment in the 
Table of Judgments is, again, not a debate I will enter here. For our purposes, it is 
enough to show why Kant thinks our intuitions are ordered by Categories in an a priori 
fashion. I do not find his argument to be at all unreasonable, given his assumptions. We 
can see that the understanding orders our intuitions in such a way that they are 
organized into experiences for us in a necessary a priori fashion.  
 
Here, though, we see a convenient relationship that Kant can exploit to make his 
assertion about this a priori synthesis a little more plausible. Since a feature of anything 
a priori is that it has a necessary and universal character, the Categories must be related 
to things that are nearly completely undetermined in order for them (the Categories) to 
have universal applicability. The more undetermined a representation is, the more likely 
we can make universal judgments about them precisely because the more determined a 
representation is the more particular it is as well. Indeed, for what Kant needs the 
Categories to do, he must argue that intuitions are almost completely undetermined, 
otherwise the Categories’ a priori relationship to intuitions collapses. 
 
But what does it mean to be a pure concept of the understanding? The Categories are 
pure insofar as they contain no empirical content. The empirical concept of dog, for 
example, contains determinations that are grounded in experience and thus not a pure 
concept. The Categories are pure because they are not grounded in experience, and 
indeed Kant wants to argue that they contain nothing experiential. But how the 
Categories are also characterized as concepts is puzzling. Indeed, in similar passages 
Kant calls the Categories functions, and, in general, we do not conceive of concepts as 
functions. We have already highlighted the differences between the Categories and 
concepts as such, and I think the differences between the two make Kant’s 
characterization of the Categories as concepts difficult to accept. The Categories are 
functions that describe the synthesis of different representations in an intuition, and 
concepts subsume specific objects under them. I do not think it is useful to think of the 
Categories as concepts at all because their functions, the things that we are concerned 
with when talking about Categories and concepts, are fundamentally different. Kant 
insists on calling the Categories concepts, but what the Categories actually represent are 
the relations between representations and not determined objects of intuitions. This is 
just what Kant means when he says that the functions of the Categories are a subject of 
transcendental logic;3
 
 the categories abstract from objects to the synthesis of 
representations in general. Once we can stop thinking of the Categories as concepts and 
start considering them simply as logical functions I think that much confusion can be 
avoided. 
But what is the “transcendental content” that Kant thinks is added to the synthesis by 
the Categories? This transcendental content is not really fully explained, but there are 
several features of it that we can identify. First, this content cannot be empirical 
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because it is transcendental, so content like colors, shapes, and sizes are not what Kant 
is referring to. This makes sense when we remember that the Categories concern the 
synthesis of representations and not those representations themselves, and this is also 
the next point. Whatever transcendental content is added by the Categories it must 
concern the synthesis of representations. Again the specifics of each Category are really 
not that important, but we can imagine that the Category of Plurality will characterize 
the synthesis of several representations as the synthesis of several particulars contained 
within a singular synthesis. The reason this content is, in fact, transcendental is because 
it does not concern the objects represented in the representations, but the synthesis of 
the representations themselves. This distinction may not be entirely clear, but we 
should consider the Category not applying to some single object or representation of an 
object, for what would it mean for Plurality of representations to be represented in a 
single representation? The Categories only make sense when we consider them as 
characterizing the synthesis of several different representations. 
 
This is a difficult point, but it is essential to understand why Kant needs the Categories 
to apply to the synthesis of representations and not to the representations themselves. 
Kant must ensure that not only is the empirical content of a representation (or the 
objects in the world outside of the understanding) preserved in some sense, while still 
maintaining the objectivity of our synthesis of these representations. Since the 
Categories concern the synthesis of the representations, the empirical content of the 
representations themselves can remain unaffected by the categorical determination, so 
we can maintain content from the world outside of us. But we can maintain objectivity 
because we can determine the synthesis through the understanding a priori in relation 
to the synthesis of that external content. In the end, Kant may not actually be able to 
salvage the situation and maintain objectivity and empirical content, but we can at least 
understand why the method of applying the Categories to the synthesis of 
representation is a good attempt anyway. 
 
Kant seems to be using the Schematism to describe how we can, in general, objectively 
apply the Categories to experience, but gives little with regard to the specifics of that 
action, in concreto. Even though he does describe each schema for each Category, it is 
fair to say that these descriptions are lacking to the point of almost complete 
uselessness except for very general indications about what Kant thinks about Schemata 
in general.4 Further, immediately before the Schematism chapter, in its introduction (A 
130-6/B 169-75), Kant argues that the power of judgment is not something that can be 
learned or explained, and later calls the Schematism (the doctrine of the power of 
judgment) “a hidden art in the depths of the human soul” (A 141/B 180). So we can see 
that Kant may not have had the highest of hopes in explaining, in detail, the particular 
action of the schematism, or the power of judgment, but that instead he wanted to 
simply explain the process in general.5
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Kant characterizes Schema as the “third thing” which is homogeneous both with an 
appearance and our concepts, and that “[t]his mediating representation must be pure 
(without anything empirical) and yet intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the 
other” (A 138/B 177). To argue that the schema must be non-empirical and sensible 
may seem initially to be contradictory, or at least confusing. Kant means that there is no 
empirical content in the schema, but that it is sensible insofar as it is determined by 
inner sensibility, i.e. Time. So Time acts as the bridge between the manifold of 
intuitions and the concepts of the understanding because both are subject to the 
transcendental determination of Time.  
 
Here Kant also most explicitly, although by no means clearly, states what the 
Schematism allows us to accomplish: “Hence an application of the category to 
appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental time-determination 
which, as the schema of the concept of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of 
the latter under the former” (A 139/B 178). The “latter” and “former” refer to 
“appearances” and “category” respectively. So the claim is that the schema of the 
category allows us to subsume the appearance under the category through a 
transcendental time-determination. Further, Kant describes what he means by schema: 
“Now this representation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a 
concept with its image is what I call the schema for this concept” (A 140/B 179-80). An 
important distinction is to be made between the representation of the “general 
procedure of the imagination” and the “image” that the imagination is providing. Kant 
is saying that the schema is the procedure, and not the image itself.  
 
What can we learn from these two passages? We need to understand that the Schemata 
are different from the Categories and intuitions, and that the Schemata are procedures 
of application, and not the object of the application itself. Kant’s unfortunate use of the 
word image in the second passage needs to be explained. He continually argues that the 
Schemata are not images, or pictures, or anything like that, but this point is obvious. 
What is not obvious is that in the procedure of application of appearance under 
category (again, schema), the appearance is not really an image either. What Kant is 
arguing is that the schema allows the subsumption of the manifold of intuition 
(organized by Time in all cases, and Space in outer sense) in general. This is painfully 
abstract and requires an explanation of several key concepts. 
 
First, how are we to understand subsumption as such? Subsumption, in general logical 
terms, is something like the action of understanding a particular being an instance of a 
universal. For example, an act of subsumption is required when I understand that dog is 
a particular instance of mammal. We say that “dog” is subsumed under “mammal.” In 
the Schematism chapter, however, the story is a little more complex. Kant’s notion of 
subsumption does not involve particular objects of representation here. Kant is 
concerned with the subsumption of the manifold under a Category. True, Kant is 
concerned with a particular manifold, namely the one given at whatever point, but it is 
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not as if this particular manifold is a particular of the universal Category. Instead, Kant 
is arguing that in any manifold there are elements of it whose synthesis can be 
subsumed under the Categories. So in a sense the Schemata concern the subsumption of 
the synthesis of the manifold under a Category, but they are more generally the rule of 
how to create that synthesis. In short, the manifold contains elements that will be 
organized by the Categories, but how we are to organize which elements by which 
Category is the Schema. The process of organization is the Schema. 
 
To use an example, Kant is not arguing that the Schema identifies in the manifold an 
example of, say, unity and then subsumes this particular example of unity under the 
Category of Unity. He is arguing that the Schema identifies relations between 
representations in the manifold in such a way that we can subsume these relations under 
the Categories. Kant’s move to abstract from particular objects of intuitions to the 
relations between these objects can again be seen as the transcendental move. He 
attempts to abstract from the particular content of the intuition to the form of the 
intuition itself. This understanding of the Schemata is similar (and not accidently) to 
Kant’s understanding of the Categories. The Categories describe the relationship 
between objects in intuitions, and the Schemata concern the relationship between the 
Categories and that relationship between objects in intuitions. 
 
Since Time is neither only empirical nor only intellectual, but in an important way both, 
we can use it to objectively ground the schematization of the Categories. The power of 
judgment does not need to add anything to the manifold of intuitions that is not already 
there from the Transcendental Aesthetic in order to apply the Categories to those 
intuitions. This idea is powerful. Problems with the objectivity of our judgments cannot 
be found in the application of the Categories to intuitions through the Schemata, but can 
only be found in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Once Kant has convinced us that Space 
and Time are a priori in intuitions, the argument of the schematism is not difficult to 
accomplish. All of our representations occur in Time, and how our representations are 
related and how these relations occur in Time define how the power of judgment is to 
schematize the Categories onto our intuitions. 
 
The view of conceptuality that I am offering is a reminder that the Categories are 
transcendental concepts and the consequences of that notion. As I argued earlier, we 
must be clear on the point that the Categories are different than concepts as such in just 
the way that we would expect from Kant, i.e. they are transcendental concepts. Their 
transcendental nature abstracts from the particular representations in intuition in general 
to the relationships between representations. This point allows us to solve (or at least 
postpone) problems that arise when dealing with the undetermined manifold of 
intuition. Further, this understanding of the Categories allows us to approach the 
Schemata in a reasonable way so that they can still function objectively, but also in a 
way that can connect experience up with thought. 
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Representations in the manifold occur in Time. This is established by the 
Transcendental Aesthetic. Relations between representations in the manifold should 
thus also occur in Time. This is, indeed, just what it means to be a representation in the 
manifold, an appearance in time. Insofar as the relationships between representations 
occur in time, it is entirely possible that we are able to identify in what ways those 
relationships occur through time. The power of this approach to the manifold is that we 
are not required to know anything about the representations or their relationships 
themselves, except for the way in which they persist (or not) through time. The content 
of the representations proper do not need to play any role in our apprehension of them 
in order for us to understand their determination in time. 
 
Because of this, Kant is able to maintain that the process of the schematization of the 
Categories still occurs a priori and that from it we can gain objective knowledge. Since 
representations are determined by time a priori there is no content about which we are 
making judgments that will make our judgments have a posteriori character. But 
because the representations themselves are a posteriori we still are making judgments 
about the world as it is empirically. Since, however, the schematization of the Category 
on the manifold is not dependent on the empirical content of representations (or the 
empirical content of their relations) and instead only concerns the forms of intuition as 
given in Time a priori we can still make a priori judgments about the manifold of 
intuition. 
 
In order for this to work, however, we must remember that the Schemata are not 
concepts, or objects, or anything of that nature, but are rules for how the power of 
judgment is to proceed in its application of the Categories. Kant must show that the 
rules for application are also a priori in order for the system to hold together. We can 
think about this in at least two different ways, but we should understand that the rules 
of schematization of the Categories are to be found in the nature of the Categories 
themselves and not in the Schematism proper. I do not mean that the rules appear in the 
section on the Categories in the book, but that we do not need to go farther than the 
Categories to understand how each will be applied to intuition. 
 
The first way to understand the rules for the application of the Categories is through a 
transcendental deduction like the one Kant attempts. I do not think this is the clearest 
way to go about the issue, and I am not entirely convinced that as it stands in the 
Critique that Kant actually successfully completes his deduction. But there is a more 
straightforward way to think about the Categories which I think gets to the point that 
Kant was driving at as well. This way is something like conceptual analysis, but 
understood in a broad sense. Take the Category of Necessity, for example. What I take 
Kant to be arguing is that necessity is just the occurrence of representations at all times. 
The important implication is that “necessity” does not have any thicker metaphysical 
meaning besides just the existence of representations at all times. What we mean when 
we talk about “necessity” is just this notion, and not anything more. 
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This may seem like it does not do justice to the concept of necessity. Our concept of 
necessity just does seem to have more to it than just the existence of representations at 
all times. There is a sense in which necessity does more metaphysical heavy lifting than 
this. We see the effects of this in attempts like the ontological argument. But this sense 
is not valid, and when we take a look at the Category of Actuality, say, we can see why. 
Actuality is representations at a certain time. This description seems to be exactly what 
we mean when we talk about actuality. Actuality is simply the existence of something 
at some time. What could be different about necessity and actuality such that the 
Category of Necessity could be a more metaphysically loaded concept than the 
Category of Actuality? There is no fundamental difference between the two except for 
their different prescriptions for time-determinations. 
 
A similar procedure could be used with the other Categories, but I will not go into 
detail with those. Kant’s point is that the fundamental concepts through which we 
organize our experience are all grounded in different determinations of Time; we can 
give these concepts any names we want, but there are still a finite number of 
combinations that will give unique determinations of the manifold of intuitions. We can 
call it Necessity or any other word, but the determination that we are talking about is 
the determination of representations at all times. Each Category has a different 
combination of representation in Time, and therefore each Category has a different 
function in the transcendental combination of the manifold of intuition. 
 
This description of the Categories does not seem to carry with it, at least at first glance, 
the power of a transcendental deduction. But if we examine how we are actually 
describing each Category, we see that it is, indeed, a conclusion from a transcendental 
argument. Experience is only possible if we determine the manifold of intuition in 
certain ways with respect to Time. The different ways that are possible to determine the 
manifold we call Categories. The procedure by which we decide how a particular 
manifold which is given to us is determined through the Categories is called a Schema. 
I think that despite its differences from Kant’s attempt at a transcendental argument, my 
conclusions and really my approach is at heart the same. In any case, the validity of the 
Categories can be reasonably established if we consider them and the Schemata in the 
way that I have described. 
 
I have attempted to construct a view of the Categories and Schemata in such a way that 
will lend credence to the possibility of their a priori validity. I have attempted to avoid 
representationalist approaches by excising pictorial interpretations of the Schemata 
from the Schematism chapter and focusing more on their procedural rule-based aspect. 
I argued that if we remind ourselves of the fact that while the Categories are indeed 
concepts, but that they are transcendental concepts we can avoid an equivocation 
between them and empirical concepts. In doing this, we should be able to see how the 
Categories apply transcendentally to representations and not representations of objects 
as such. I think in this way we can still maintain the benefits of transcendental idealism 
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while avoiding some of the pitfalls that objections like the form/matter distinction 
highlight. Even if we have only pushed back the problems to the Transcendental 
Aesthetic (I think we have done more than that), we have still done much to show that 
the Categories and Schemata are not the source of the problems. 
 
 
                                                          
1 All passages from the Critique of Pure Reason are from Guyer’s and Wood’s translation on Cambridge 
University Press, 2008. 
 
2 See A 89-91/B 122-3 for Kant’s analysis on this point, also A 100-1 in the A Deduction proper. 
3 A 78-9/B 104. 
 
4 There are a few exceptions, but many of Kant’s descriptions of the twelve pure Schemata are painfully 
obscure. 
 
5 Pippin also addresses the issue of how specifically Kant addresses the action of the power of judgment 
as opposed to simply describing its ground in objectivity. See Pippin, Robert. Kant’s Theory of Form. 
Yale University Press, Ann Arbor: 1982. Chapter 5. 
